Silicon ChipThe History of AMD, Part 2 - December 2026 SILICON CHIP
  1. Outer Front Cover
  2. Contents
  3. Publisher's Letter: I seriously underestimated AI coding
  4. Feature: The History of AMD, Part 2 by Dr David Maddison, VK3DSM
  5. Project: Advanced Cable Analyser by Richard Palmer
  6. Project: Inrush Current Limiter by Phil Prosser
  7. Feature: Motor Control, Part 3 by Andrew Levido
  8. Project: NeoPixel RGB LED Analog Clock, Part 2 by Nicholas Vinen
  9. Feature: Working with AVR & PIC Fuses, Part 1 by Tim Blythman
  10. PartShop
  11. Project: The Magic Candle by Dr Hugo Holden
  12. Serviceman's Log: Working with switch-mode power supplies by Malcolm Batchelor et al
  13. Vintage Radio: STC Bantam model A141 by Ian Batty
  14. Subscriptions
  15. Market Centre
  16. Advertising Index
  17. Notes & Errata: PicoSDR, April 2026
  18. Outer Back Cover

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  • The History of AMD, Part 1 (November 2026)
  • The History of AMD, Part 2 (December 2026)
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  • Motor Control, Part 2 (November 2026)
  • Motor Control, Part 3 (December 2026)
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  • NeoPixel RGB LED Analog Clock, Part 2 (December 2026)
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Part 2 by Dr David Maddison, VK3DSM Image source: www.pexels.com/photo/vintage-computermotherboard-with-cpu-and-ram-slots-37256941 THE HISTORY OF AMD trials and tribulations We started this series last month by describing how AMD was started by a few disgruntled Fairchild employees (like Intel...) initially operating from a garage. It grew quickly, to the point of building clones of most of Intel’s processors. We continue from 1993, with the Pentium on the horizon. T he period covered in the first article in this series was roughly 1969 to 1995. During that time, its main products were copies of other company’s designs, usually under license, sometimes via reverse engineering. However, AMD did design its own chips, some of them quite complex. One such example was the Am2900 chipset from the mid-1970s, a powerful (for the time) processor solution that was used in minicomputers and mainframes. From that, its ambition only grew, and AMD would soon start producing RISC processors that were 14 Silicon Chip well ahead of their time, such as the Am29000. The Am29000 By 1993, AMD had produced the Am386 (1991) and Am486 (1993). To understand the next part of the AMD journey, we need to take a step back for a moment. By 1975, the microprocessor market was split into two philosophies: cheap and slower single-­chip CPUs like the Am9080/Intel 8080, or expensive but faster/more powerful multi-chip processors like the Am2900 family. Australia's electronics magazine The multi-chip Am2900 family used bit-slice technology to build powerful processors for markets where cost was no object, such as high-end minicomputers, military hardware and graphics applications. Chips like the Am9080 were used for hobby and consumer PCs. Systems built using AMD’s Am2900 chips ran extremely fast (for the time) at around 20-40MHz, compared to x86 processors like the 8080 (1974) and 8085 (1976), which ran at 2-3MHz. Because they were so fast, they could even run emulators to mimic the 8085, which could run up to ten times faster than the actual 8085 chip. As processor technology advanced, AMD moved away from the multichip bit-slice concept to produce the single-chip Am29000, also known as the 29k (see Figs.13 & 14). Like the Am2900, it was a RISC processor. When it was introduced in 1987/1988, it was one of the fastest 32-bit processors in the world, running 3-5 times faster than CISC chips of the time. For example, the first version of the Am29000 could achieve 17-23MIPS (million instructions per second), while CISC processors like the Intel 80386 or Motorola 68020 would run at only 3-5MIPS. Although the Am29000 was not an x86 processor, for reasons that will be explained later, this chip allowed AMD to compete with the new Intel Pentium (released in 1993) which Intel refused to license to AMD (along with the 80386 and 80486; AMD reverse-­ engineered them as mentioned previously). In the 1990s, x86 processors were dominant in the PC market even though the 29k was significantly faster. The 29k beat Intel in the embedded processor market for such devices as HP Color LaserJet printers and graphics terminals, but as the 29k was not an x86 processor, how could it be used in the PC market if it didn’t ‘speak’ the x86 language? Despite being faster, the 29k was losing money. Therefore, in 1995, AMD officially cancelled the entire 29k family of processors and moved the engineering team to its PC division. Since AMD already had an advanced, superfast RISC processor in the form of the 29k, it would have been foolish to waste the design effort, so they recycled elements of the design into what they called the K5. siliconchip.com.au This was to be AMD’s next big processor, designed to compete against Intel’s Pentium (1993), specifically the P5 and P54C versions. “K” in K5 stands for the fictional element Kryptonite, which is Superman’s only weakness (by analogy, Superman was Intel). The “5” is a reference to the Pentium, which was so-named because it was next in the series after the 286, 386 and 486. Developing the K5 The architecture of the Am29000 (29k) released to customers in 1988 was completely unrelated to the Intel x86 architecture. The 32-bit Am29000 was a RISC processor. However, AMD needed something to compete with the Intel Pentium, which was released in 1993. To build a competitive processor, they took elements of an unreleased version of the Am29000 codenamed “Jaguar”, such as the mathematical engines and out-of-order execution logic, and attached an x86 decoding front-end, which translated x86 instructions into 29k-style RISC instructions on-the-fly (which they called RISC-ops). For the back-end, they used the physical execution units, arithmetic logic units (ALUs) and maths coprocessors from the 29k. The K5 contained five ALUs from the Jaguar microarchitecture. To handle speculative out-of-order execution, where the processor can execute instructions ahead of time based on what it predicts the software will do next, it relied on the Reorder Buffer (ROB) from the Jaguar, with minor modifications to keep track of x86 registers rather than 29k registers. The floating-point unit (FPU) was taken from the Am29050 to be used in the K5. The K5 also adopted the concept of the branch target cache (BTC) from the Am29000, which minimised processor pipeline stalls by storing the targets of predicted program branches (eg, conditional jump instructions). The BTC is a tiny, high-speed memory buffer that instantly feeds the first few instructions of a detour in code (such as an if/else statement that forces the computer to break from a linear sequence to a different set of instructions), giving the slower main memory enough time to catch up without stalling the processor. siliconchip.com.au RISC vs CISC RISC stands for Reduced Instruction Set Computer, while CISC stands for Complex Instruction Set Computer. In the 1970s and 1980s, these represented two different approaches to designing processors, although the distinction has become much less clear over time. The idea behind RISC processors was to use a relatively small set of simple, regular instructions. These were often encoded using fixed-length instruction words, making them easier to decode and pipeline efficiently. In contrast, CISC processors used larger and more complex instruction sets, often with variable-length instructions and many addressing modes. Some instructions could do quite a lot of work, but might take multiple clock cycles to complete. This was considered programmer-friendly, especially when more software was written directly in assembly language. Arm and RISC-V are modern examples of RISC-derived instruction set architectures. The main surviving CISC architecture in general-purpose computers is x86, as used by Intel and AMD processors. However, modern Intel and AMD x86 processors do not execute most x86 instructions in a simple, literal way. Instead, they decode them into internal micro-operations, which are then scheduled and executed by a highly optimised processor core. These internal operations are often described as RISC-like, although they are private implementation details rather than a separate RISC instruction set. The AMD K5 was an early example of this approach. Over time, the distinction between RISC and CISC has blurred. CISC processors such as x86 adopted many RISC-like implementation techniques, including pipelining, register renaming, out-of-order execution and internal micro-operations. Meanwhile, RISC architectures became more complex, adding features such as compressed instruction encodings, SIMD/vector extensions, memoryordering features, privilege modes and specialised instructions. As a result, RISC and CISC now mostly describe the software-visible instruction set architecture, not a simple division between how processors work internally. Figs.13 & 14: the AM29000 chip and die. Sources: https://w.wiki/ RQYm https://w.wiki/ RQYn Australia's electronics magazine December 2026  15 Fig.15: the AMD K5 block diagram. Note the four instruction decoders to convert x86 instructions to RISC-like instructions. The K5 was designed to be pin-­ compatible with the Pentium; a user could simply unplug their Pentium from a Socket 5 or Socket 7 motherboard and drop in a K5. However, the K5 turned out to be a disappointment. It suffered from serious design flaws: lower-than-expected clock speeds and poor performance compared to Intel’s Pentium and Pentium Pro. The K5’s fatal flaw Original source: https://w.wiki/RQYe In essence, the K5 was less of a Pentium clone and more of an Am29000 masquerading as a Pentium. Independent Architecture and the GHz race (1996-2003) After the legal battles of the 386/486 era, AMD made a strategic decision to stop relying on reverse engineering and commit to designing its own next-generation x86 processors from the ground up. This led to the K5, K6, and K7 (Athlon) processor families that would ultimately transform the company. The 32-bit K5 (Figs.15-17) was released in 1996. It was AMD’s first independently designed x86 microprocessor, intended to compete with Intel’s Pentium. AMD’s core RISC architecture was highly efficient, but it struggled to meet the clock speeds of Intel chips, which the marketplace viewed as a competitive feature. Because of the high efficiency of the RISC architecture compared to CISC, it is not necessary to have the same high clock speeds for equivalent performance. However, to overcome this marketing deficiency, AMD introduced the concept of PR or Processor Rating numbers. For example, an AMD K5-PR100 ran at a physical clock speed of only 66MHz but AMD claimed it was equivalent to an Intel Pentium running at 100MHz, hence 100 in the name of the K5. AMD also sold the PR100 at much higher prices than the 100MHz Pentium. The K5 had superior raw integer processing performance to the Pentium, which made it better for running typical office software, but it had an inferior FPU, which is necessary for complex 3D mathematical operations as used in games. It happened that, just after the K5 was launched, 3D games like Quake were released, which ran much better on the Pentium’s superior FPU. Thus, the Pentium retained the loyalty of gamers and power users, for the time being at least. The chip taught AMD painful but valuable lessons about the extreme difficulty of designing competitive x86 processors. Nevertheless, as AMD’s first fully in-house designed x86 CPU, it was an important milestone for them. Introducing the K6 AMD recovered quickly with the 32-bit K6 (1997), which was based on technology acquired from NexGen – see Figs.18 & 19. AMD made a strategic acquisition by purchasing NexGen in 1996. It was a small but innovative semiconductor company founded in 1986. NexGen had developed one of the most advanced x86 processor designs of the era with its Nx586 and Nx686 architectures, which used a RISC-like internal core that translated complex Fig.16: the AMD K5 physical package. Image sources. Source: https://w. wiki/RQYf Fig.17: the AMD K5 die. It’s significantly more complex than its predecessors. Source: https://w. wiki/RQYd 16 Silicon Chip Australia's electronics magazine siliconchip.com.au x86 instructions into simpler micro-­ operations, much like the K5. NexGen extensively patented this concept, releasing its Nx586 in 1994, before the K5. Struggling with the disappointing performance of its own K5 processor, AMD acquired NexGen for approximately US $850 million in stock. The acquisition proved to be a turning point. AMD scrapped much of the troubled K5 project and adopted NexGen’s superior microarchitecture, using the Nx686 as the foundation for the K6 processor, adding a floating-­ point unit and adapting the chip to fit standard motherboards. It then launched the K6 in 1997. Many of NexGen’s top engineers also joined AMD, bringing critical expertise that would later contribute to the successful Athlon (K7) and subsequent generations. The NexGen acquisition gave AMD both advanced technology and vital engineering talent at a crucial moment in its history. The K6 was a much stronger performer than the K5, finally giving AMD a credible competitor to Intel’s Pentium II (1997). It introduced features such as MMX (multimedia extensions) support and a larger internal memory cache. While still behind Intel in raw single-­threaded performance and manufacturing process technology, the K6 allowed AMD to regain market share through aggressive pricing and excellent floating-point performance. The K6 series proved that AMD could produce competitive processors, but it also highlighted that the company was still playing catch-up to an extent. The K7 A breakthrough came with the 32-bit K7, codenamed Athlon, launched in Complicated Athlon naming schemes AMD’s K7 chips were sold over 1999-2003, while the K8 chips were sold during 2003-2007. The 32-bit K7 was named AMD Athlon, with later models being Athlon XP. They competed against the Pentium III and early Pentium 4. For the K8, AMD decided to keep the trusted Athlon name, which had gained great respect and market success, while adding 64 to indicate this was the world’s first mainstream 64-bit processor. It was named Athlon 64 and later Athlon 64 X2 (dual-core). K7 and K8 were internal names, not official names, while K5 and K6 were official names; the “K” series was discontinued after the K8. Anther name used for the K7 is the Duron, which was the budget version, launched in 2000. It had a smaller L2 cache to reduce its cost. The K8 used the names Opteron for its enterprise/server model, which competed against the Intel Xeon; Athlon for mainstream models, which competed against the Pentium; and Duron or Sempron for the budget versions, which competed against the Intel Celeron. The Turion 64 was used for laptops and competed against the Pentium M. See Table 4 overleaf. Fig.20: an AMD Athlon (Thunderbird) PGA socket CPU. For this generation, they abandoned the heat spreader for better thermal contact between the die and the heatsink. It worked, but unfortunately it was possible to crack the die if too much or uneven clamping force was applied. Source: https://w. wiki/RQZG 1999 – see Figs.20 & 21. The Athlon represented a complete architectural overhaul and was AMD’s most ambitious project to date. Its key innovations included a completely new superscalar, out-of-order execution microarchitecture with nine execution units; a revolutionary EV6 bus (originally developed by Digital Equipment Corporation [DEC]) instead of Intel’s GTL+ bus, allowing much higher bandwidth and easier multiprocessing; and excellent floating-­point performance. The original “Classic” Athlon processor was in the Slot A format, like Intel’s Pentium II (see Fig.22). In March 2000, AMD achieved a historic milestone when it released the Athlon 1GHz. It was the first x86 processor in the world to reach 1GHz (1000MHz or one billion instruction clock pulses per second). From August 1999 until January 2002, it was the fastest x86 chip in the world. This was a major psychological and marketing victory over Intel. The Athlon not only matched but often exceeded Intel’s Pentium III (1999) performance, particularly in gaming and content creation. For the first time in its history, AMD was widely regarded as having the faster desktop processor. The success of the Figs.18 & 19: an AMD K6-233APR processor and die. The metal can on top is a heat spreader that also physically protects the silicon die underneath. Most modern CPUs use a similar approach. Sources: https://w. wiki/RQZC https://w.wiki/ RQZD siliconchip.com.au Australia's electronics magazine December 2026  17 Athlon showed that AMD was no longer just a cheaper alternative; it led the market in performance, at least for a while. This coup was achieved through a combination of talented individuals, hard work, careful planning and calculated risks. The relative success of the K6, thanks to the acquisition of NexGen, generated the breathing room and cash flow to attempt something more ambitious. AMD had its own technical experts, the people they brought on from NexGen, and also benefited from talent connected with DEC/Alpha, including Dirk Meyer and Jim Keller. The K7 they developed had strong out-of-order execution, a much better floating-point unit than AMD’s earlier chips and a bus architecture influenced by DEC’s Alpha EV6 bus. Intel was also heading toward the Pentium 4/NetBurst era, where it would chase clock speed very aggressively, with limited success. During 1999-2003, Intel was not making flawless architectural choices, and AMD exploited that gap. AMD used partnerships to compensate for being smaller. Jerry Sanders’ “virtual gorilla” strategy said that since AMD could not match Intel’s internal resources, it could partner its way into competitiveness. For example, they partnered with Motorola to develop a copper interconnect process. Athlon was among Fig.21: the AMD K7 “Athlon” architecture, again a step up in complexity but bringing significant performance benefits. Source: https://w.wiki/RQZE Fig.22: the original Athlon processor, the Athlon Classic in Slot A configuration. The chips on both sides are L2 cache memories. Like Intel, AMD later abandoned the slot form factor due to frequency limitations. Source: https://w.wiki/RQYg 18 Silicon Chip Australia's electronics magazine the first commercial processors to use copper interconnect technology, helping AMD push frequency and efficiency. Wired reported in August 1999 that AMD claimed the Athlon 600 was about 9% faster on average than a 600MHz Pentium III and 21% faster in graphics tests. Custom PC’s retrospective on the Athlon 600 backs up those figures. Innovation leadership (2003-2007) Encouraged by the Athlon’s success, AMD went further into the highend market. In 2003, the company launched the Opteron processor, the first implementation of K8 architecture (see Figs.23 & 24). The Opteron introduced AMD64 (later known as x86-64), a 64-bit extension to the x86 instruction set that AMD developed. Basically, AMD decided to unilaterally extend the 32-bit x86 instruction set to 64 bits, allowing vastly larger amounts of memory to be addressed linearly (the 32-bit limit was 4GiB) while maintaining full backward compatibility with 32-bit software. This proved to be highly successful, as Microsoft, the Linux kernel developers and other operating system vendors quickly added support. Most importantly, Intel itself eventually adopted AMD64, initially calling it EM64T and later Intel 64, rather than continuing with its own incompatible 64-bit architecture (Itanium/IA-64). By 2006, Intel had fully embraced AMD64, making it the universal standard for 64-bit x86 computing. AMD64’s success gave AMD a temporary technological lead, and it also ensured the long-term survival of the x86 architecture into the 64-bit era. Unlike Intel’s earlier failed Itanium architecture, AMD64 offered full backward compatibility with 32-bit software while adding true 64-bit addressing and performance. The Opteron quickly gained traction in the server market, particularly for scientific computing, databases and high-­ performance clusters. It gave AMD its first serious inroads into the enterprise server segment, a market Intel had long dominated. While the 1GHz K7 Athlon relied on a traditional Front Side Bus (FSB) to access RAM via a separate memory controller chip on the motherboard, siliconchip.com.au Table 4: a comparison of some AMD K7/K8 variants and competing parts from Intel AMD processor Year Target market Intel competitor Outcome Athlon (K7) 1999 High performance Pentium III Slot 1 Athlon Slot A (cartridge), 500-1000MHz. Faster than the Pentium III. Athlon (K7) 2000 High performance Pentium III Socket 370 Athlon Slot A, equivalent in performance to the Intel model. AMD crossed the 1GHz barrier one day before Intel. Athlon XP (K7) 2001 Budget desktops Early Pentium 4 Popular socketed version. Athlon MP (K7) 2001 High-end workstations and servers Early Xeon processors based on the Pentium III and early Pentium 4 Designed to support dual-CPU motherboards for workstations. Duron (K7) 2000 Budget desktops Celeron Duron was superior to Celeron. Athlon 64 single-core (K8) 2003 High performance Single-core Pentium 4 AMD had the superior processor. Athlon 64 FX Ultrapremium single-core (K8) 2003 Gamers, overclockers. Pentium 4 Extreme Edition The FX was the pinnacle of single-core gaming performance at the time. Opteron (K8) 2003 Servers/data centres Pentium 4 Xeons AMD had superior architecture and performance in this era. Athlon 64 FX dual-core and Quad-FX models (K8) 20032006 High performance Core 2 Extreme 6800, Core 2 Quad The Quad FX needed a special motherboard to run two dual-core FX chips at the same time; Intel’s Quad model was a single chip. Sempron (K8) 2004 Budget desktops Celeron D (based on the Pentium 4) A competitive “value” battle. Athlon 64 X2 early dualcore models (K8) 2005 High performance Pentium D 800 and 900 series “Presler” AMD’s dual-core chip was superior to Intel’s dual-die approach for the Pentium D. Turion 64 (K8) 2005 Laptops/mobile Pentium M Turion was 64-bit vs the 32-bit Pentium M, but the Pentium offered superior battery life. Athlon 64 X2 later dualcore models (K8) 20062009 High performance Core 2 Duo To remain competitive, AMD pushed the K8 to 3.2GHz (Athlon X2 6400+). Figs.23 & 24: the dies of a four-core Opteron “Barcelona” (left) and six-core Opteron “Instanbul” (right) processor. Sources: https://w.wiki/RQZH & https://w.wiki/RQZJ siliconchip.com.au Australia's electronics magazine December 2026  19 the K8 removed this bottleneck by building the memory controller directly into the CPU and using AMD’s “HyperTransport” technology for fast communication with the cores. Internally, the K8 was an evolution of the K7. Its performance gains came mostly from architectural improvements, such as the integrated memory controller, HyperTransport system bus and AMD64 extensions. By reducing memory latency and improving the way the processor communicated with the rest of the system, the K8 could often do more useful work per clock than earlier x86 processors. Early Slot-A versions of the K7/Athlon used separate Level 2 cache chips mounted inside the processor cartridge, rather than placing the cache on the CPU die itself. Later K7 versions, starting with Thunderbird, moved the Level 2 cache onto the processor die, where it could run at the full processor speed. The later K8/Athlon 64 and Opteron processors also had on-die Level 2 cache. In addition, later versions of the K8, like the Athlon 64 X2, had two processor cores on a single piece of silicon. The Athlon 64 X2 was not the first consumer dual-core CPU, as Intel’s Pentium Extreme Edition 840 and Pentium D reached the desktop market slightly earlier. However, AMD’s implementation was widely regarded as the cleaner and more effective design, and it was AMD’s first native dual-core desktop processor. The K5-to-Opteron era (1996–2003) was a major transformative period in AMD’s history. The company completed its transition to a genuine innovator. Although the K5 and early K6 had difficult teething problems, the engineering and other lessons learned during those years directly enabled the spectacular success of the Athlon and Opteron. By 2003, AMD had proven it could design world-class processors, competing fiercely with Intel on both performance and price. AMD’s entry into the graphics market AMD’s entry into the graphics market began with another of its strategic moves. In July 2006, AMD acquired ATI Technologies for US$5.6 billion. This was one of the largest acquisitions in the semiconductor industry at the time. The deal was intended to transform AMD from a CPU specialist into a full-platform provider, capable of competing with Intel across both processors and graphics. The CEO at the time, Hector Ruiz, believed the future of computing lay in “heterogeneous integration”. This is the combining of CPU and GPU capabilities on the same chip or package, where both processors can work together on general-purpose computing tasks, not just graphics. By owning ATI’s Radeon graphics technology, AMD hoped to accelerate the development of integrated “Fusion” processors (later called APUs, accelerated processing units) that would merge the CPU and GPU on the same chip. ATI acquisition By acquiring ATI in 2006, AMD gained several critical assets: 1. The well-established Radeon graphics brand. 2. Advanced GPU architectures, including the highly regarded R300 family (Radeon 9700/9800) that had pioneered programmable shaders, with excellent image quality. 3. Substantial expertise in high-­ performance graphics for both consumer gaming and professional workstations (FireGL/FirePro). 4. Early work on combining graphics with other processing functions. This acquisition transformed AMD from a CPU-only company into a true CPU + GPU competitor almost overnight. While the integration proved difficult and expensive in the short term, which contributed to AMD’s financial struggles in the following years, it laid essential groundwork for later successes, including Ryzen APUs and the Instinct line of AI accelerators (described later). The ATI acquisition was therefore not merely about entering the graphics card business. It was a longterm strategic gamble that the future of computing would involve tightly coupled CPU and GPU silicon working together. This vision would take more than a decade to fully mature, ultimately becoming one of AMD’s greatest strengths. Intel was increasingly integrating basic graphics directly into its processors (Intel GMA, Graphics Media Accelerator) during 2004-2006, aiming to control the entire PC platform and reduce the need for discrete graphics cards. But for AMD, CEO Hector Ruiz believed the future of the company and computing in general was with heterogeneous computing. Heterogeneous computing After acquiring ATI, AMD began working toward processors that combined x86 CPU cores and Fig.25: the ATI Radeon HD 2900 XT launched in May 2007, and was one of the first cards to be released after AMD had acquired ATI in 2006. Source: www. vgamuseum.info/index. php/home/item/666-atiradeon-hd-2900-xt 20 Silicon Chip Australia's electronics magazine siliconchip.com.au Radeon-­ derived GPU cores on the same die (APUs). This fitted into the broader idea of heterogeneous computing, where different types of processor cores are used for the tasks they handle best. A CPU is well-suited to general-purpose sequential code and operating-system tasks, while a GPU can process many similar operations in parallel. Programming systems such as OpenCL (Open Computing Language) were designed to let software use this mixture of CPUs, GPUs and other processors in a more portable way. This vision took time to mature. NVIDIA’s CUDA software platform became dominant in GPU computing, helped by strong hardware, early developer support and a growing software ecosystem. OpenCL remained important, but it did not become the main programming model for high-performance GPU computing in the way its supporters (including AMD) once hoped. Even so, AMD’s Fusion/APU thinking was important. It helped establish the idea that the GPU should was a major computing resource inside the system. Dark years & the Bulldozer architecture (2008-2016) Up to 2007, AMD was in a very strong position with the success and popularity of the Athlon series of processors, culminating in the Athlon X2, successfully competing with Intel’s offerings. Then things took a turn for the worse during the so-called Dark Years, roughly between 2007-2016. While the Athlon X2 wasn’t discontinued until 2009, sales had already slumped by 2008, and the later X2s were marketed as budget processors. Despite strong momentum up to that point, the company started to face a series of strategic, technical and financial difficulties that lasted nearly a decade and brought it close to collapse. The acquisition of ATI was seemingly the correct move based on the future of heterogeneous computing, but it added significant debt to the company. Also, integrating two large engineering organisations with different cultures proved more difficult than expected. The development of the first “Fusion” APUs took longer than planned and consumed substantial resources. siliconchip.com.au On top of those considerable challenges came the global financial crisis of 2008. PC and server demand weakened sharply, hurting both AMD and Intel. AMD was more vulnerable because it carried a heavier debt load, had fewer financial reserves, and was less dominant in the high-margin server market. The company reported a large loss in 2008 and was forced to cut costs aggressively. In October 2008, AMD announced plans to split off its manufacturing operations into a new company, which was formally launched as GlobalFoundries in March 2009. This marked AMD’s transition away from being an integrated device manufacturer, like Intel, toward becoming a fabless chip designer. From this point on, AMD would design processors but rely on external foundries, initially and primarily GlobalFoundries, to manufacture them. The move reduced AMD’s capital burden, but it was not an instant escape from manufacturing problems. AMD remained closely tied to GlobalFoundries through wafer-­ supply agreements, so GlobalFoundries’ process delays and yield problems would later cause difficulties of their own. In the longer term, however, becoming fabless gave AMD more flexibility, eventually allowing it to take advantage of TSMC’s (Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company) increasingly advanced manufacturing technology. At the same time, two of AMD’s major technical initiatives from this era, Bulldozer and Fusion, produced disappointing or mixed results. Fusion helped establish the APU concept, but Bulldozer failed to deliver the expected performance and efficiency gains, leaving AMD to flounder. Bulldozer AMD suffered a major technical setback with its first completely new CPU architecture since the K8, the Bulldozer architecture (October 2011). It introduced a modular design in which two integer cores shared a single floating-point unit and other resources (Fig.26). The flagship of the Bulldozer architecture upon its release was the FX-8150 on a single 315mm2 silicon chip. The multi-chip 16-core Opteron “Interlagos” had two 8-core chips in one CPU package (AMD kept the Opteron name over several processor generations). The goal was to improve multithreaded performance and power efficiency while reducing die area. In practice, however, the design delivered disappointing results. Single-­ threaded performance was often lower than the previous generation of processors. Fig.26: an AMD Bulldozer architecture die (32nm), possibly the FX-8150. Each Bulldozer module had two integer cores sharing a single floating-point unit. Thus, four modules gave eight cores. Source: https://w.wiki/ RQYj Australia's electronics magazine December 2026  21 Technical problems included that branch prediction was weak, cache latency was high, and the chip struggled to reach competitive clock speeds. The FX-8150, despite having eight cores, frequently underperformed Intel’s quad-core Sandy Bridge processors in many consumer workloads. Power consumption was also higher than expected. AMD attempted improvements to Bulldozer with Piledriver (2012) and Excavator (2015), which brought some improvements in efficiency and clock speed, but they did not close the performance gap with Intel’s Haswell and Broadwell processors. As a result, AMD lost considerable market share in both the desktop and server segments. By 2013, Intel held roughly 80-85% of the x86 microprocessor market, while AMD’s share fell into the low teens. Due to the Bulldozer, Piledriver and Excavator failures, AMD’s financial situation became critical. They reported net losses in multiple years between 2011 and 2015. The company’s stock price dropped below US$2 in 2015; market analysts questioned whether AMD could even survive as an independent company. Multiple staff layoffs occurred, and AMD was forced to restructure several times. Manufacturing dependence on GlobalFoundries (the former AMD spin-off) also became a disadvantage, as GlobalFoundries lagged behind TSMC and Intel in process technology during this period. Fusion APUs – an idea before its time? While Bulldozer struggled, AMD pushed forward with its Fusion processors. This was the direct result of the 2006 ATI acquisition and part of AMD’s heterogeneous computing strategy. Fusion was the marketing name, but AMD gave them the technical name of APUs, hence they were called AMD Fusion APUs. However, the Fusion name had to be phased out starting in 2012 due to trademark conflicts, leaving the processors to be called APUs. As a result, they phased out the name Fusion System Architecture (FSA) and started to use the term Heterogeneous System Architecture (HSA). Fusion aimed to combine CPU and GPU cores on the same die, AMD’s vision for heterogeneous computing 22 Silicon Chip at the time (before moving to the chiplet concept). These early APUs offered very good integrated graphics and power efficiency, but their CPU performance (with Bulldozer-derived cores) was mediocre. They were decent for budget laptops and desktops but couldn’t compete effectively with Intel’s stronger CPU cores at the time. Despite these difficulties, AMD maintained the vision of investing in its heterogeneous computing strategy. The company released its first APUs (later rebranded as Ryzen with Graphics), such as the processors with the internal development names of Llano (2011), Trinity (2012), Richland (2013), Kaveri (2014) and Bristol Ridge (2016). These generations were all sold under the name A-Series, with different designations under that. Transition to chiplets The progression from the Fusion concept to a chiplet architecture in 2017 represents one of the greatest transitions in semiconductor history. It marked AMD’s shift from a failed ‘all-in-one’ monolithic processor philosophy (CPU, GPU and other parts all on one piece of silicon) to a modular ‘Lego-brick’ style strategy that fundamentally saved the company. The successful production of chiplet-­based CPUs allowed for cost reduction, better yields, process node optimisation (only using expensive nodes for parts of the processor) and excellent scalability. Throughout the Dark Years, the Fusion strategy relied on monolithic dies. As processors get larger, the chance of a manufacturing defect increases exponentially. If one tiny part of a massive monolithic chip is broken, the entire expensive chip has to be thrown away (although, in some cases, sections can be disabled and it can be sold as a less capable part for less money). The scaling problem Under Fusion, AMD had to spend immense resources designing completely different monolithic chips for laptops, desktops and servers. Short of cash, AMD simply couldn’t afford the research and development to compete with Intel across all these markets. A crucial leadership transition occurred in 2014. Dr Lisa Su, who had joined AMD in 2012 as head of global Australia's electronics magazine Fig.27: current (since 2014) AMD CEO Dr Lisa Tzwu-Fang Su. She joined at the tail end of the ‘dark years’ and has overseen AMD’s partial overtake of Intel, thanks to the Zen architecture. Source: https://w.wiki/3q$z business development, was promoted to CEO in October 2014. Su was a highly respected engineer with a strong technical background and immediately began a major restructuring. She simplified AMD’s product roadmap, reduced operating expenses and refocused the company on engineering execution. Most importantly, she initiated the development of a completely new CPU architecture called Zen, which aimed to address the fundamental weaknesses of Bulldozer. By 2015-2016, AMD was operating in survival mode. The company had managed to preserve its graphics business and made progress on APUs, but it still remained far behind Intel in CPU competitiveness. Observers at the time gave AMD few chances of a meaningful recovery. The period from 2007 to 2016 tested the company’s resilience and forced it to confront deep structural problems in design philosophy, manufacturing strategy and organisational efficiency. These difficult years also created the conditions for renewal. The painful lessons from Bulldozer, the integration challenges from the ATI acquisition, and the financial pressure from that and the global financial crisis ultimately pushed AMD toward a disciplined, engineering-focused approach that would define its later success under Su’s leadership. Infinity Fabric Architecture AMD started developing Infinity Fabric technology around 2012-13, unveiling it in 2017. They realised siliconchip.com.au Fig.28: how Infinity Fabric is used to connect the core complexes (CCDs) and I/O die (cIOD) in a modern AMD processor. Source: www.igorslab.de/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/zen4guide_slide_4.jpg that Zen would require a scalable, modular connection methodology to make it work. The actual engineering work was done by Jim Keller and Mark Papermaster, with Dr Su, then Senior Vice President (2012-14), providing executive leadership, engineering insight and corporate strategy. Infinity Fabric (IF) is the internal ‘data highway’ for all modern AMD chips. It is AMD’s proprietary highspeed interconnect technology, introduced in 2017 with the first Zen-based Ryzen processors (see Fig.28). It enables modular chiplet-based designs by providing a means to connect multiple independent silicon dies, such as CPU and GPU cores, I/O components, cache memories, memory controllers, AI accelerators and others, to communicate with each other at high speeds. It is the main reason AMD’s chiplet designs are so effective. Apart from communication within the processor module, it also allows system-wide communication with peripherals like PCIe cards and USB devices. It is even scalable to data centres and exascale supercomputers. This communication protocol allows the use of multiple chiplets in processor designs, which can be ‘mixed and matched’ to produce different variations of processors without having to design new chips from scratch. AMD developed Infinity Fabric to replace HyperTransport, which it introduced in the early 2000s. While HyperTransport was advanced for the siliconchip.com.au time, it was not flexible enough for the new chiplet-based design philosophy AMD wanted to implement. Infinity Fabric was built to support: • Multiple chiplets connected together on the same package • High-bandwidth and low-latency communication • Scalability across desktop, server and data centre products Infinity Fabric is a combination of physical hardware and software-like communication protocols. The Physical Layer defines the wires, circuits and interfaces embedded within the chip to transmit electrical signals. These can be copper or aluminium wires directly on the silicon chip, on-package traces embedded in the package substrate that carries the chiplets, or off-package lanes comprising physical tracks in the motherboard or between CPU or GPU sockets on a server. The Control Layer defines the rules. This is the communication protocol defining how packets are formatted, addressed and verified. It also manages cache coherency to ensure that different parts of the system have the Table 5: AMD CEOs CEO Years in charge W. J. “Jerry” Sanders III 1969-2002 Hector Ruiz 2002-2008 Dirk Meyer 2008-2011 Rory Read 2011-2014 Dr Lisa Su 2014-present Australia's electronics magazine same idea of what’s in each memory location despite changes not propagating instantly. The Control Layer also uses embedded sensors across the silicon chip to dynamically adjust clock speeds, voltages and data routing based on temperatures and workload demands. The two main electronic protocols of the Control Layer are: 1. The Infinity Fabric Data Path (IFD) is the high-bandwidth pathway responsible for moving data between components. It uses high-speed SerDes (Serialiser/Deserialiser) for converting between parallel and serial formats. In Zen-based processors, these links typically run at very high frequencies, up to 32GT/s (gigatransfers per second) in recent generations. 2. The Infinity Fabric Control Path (IFC) handles configuration, synchronisation, power management and coordination between the different dies and subsystems. For AMD’s heterogeneous computing philosophy, Infinity Fabric is a key enabling technology. It allows CPU cores, GPU cores, I/O dies, memory controllers and other functional blocks to exchange data efficiently, both within a single chip package and, in some systems, between separate processors or accelerators. Today, Infinity Fabric is one of AMD’s most important architectural advantages. It helped AMD scale EPYC server processors to high core counts using chiplets, while also supporting advanced products such as the AMD Instinct MI300 series, where CPUs, December 2026  23 GPUs and high-bandwidth memory can be tightly coupled inside a single package. The architecture of Infinity Fabric is shown in Fig.29. The following abbreviations are used in the diagram: • 32G SerDes: refers to processors (like the 4th Gen EPYC series) that support IF lanes/links operating at speeds up to 32Gbps. • 2P: two-processor (dual-socket). A server board setup containing two physical AMD EPYC CPUs linked via dedicated IF lanes. • G Links: dedicated PCIe I/O lanes originating from the processor that are explicitly designed to connect GPUs, storage devices and networking cards. • P Links: dedicated PCIe I/O lanes optimised for single-socket (1P) servers. A CPU part number ending in “P” (eg, EPYC 9654P) is designed to use all available SerDes links as PCIe I/O rather than inter-CPU IF. • D5: a DDR5 (5th generation double data rate) random access memory (RAM) module. • 3L/4L: 3-link/4-link specifies how many physical IF connections are bound together between computing resources (such as multiple graphics dies or separate server dies) to multiply the total bidirectional bandwidth (up to 400Gbps). • Fabric + IO: the central I/O die and Infinity Fabric infrastructure used to connect the CPU cores, memory controllers, PCIe/CXL interfaces and inter-socket links. • 1DPC: one DIMM per channel, meaning that each Dual Inline Memory Module has a dedicated communication channel rather than sharing one between two. AMD has also worked with industry partners such as Broadcom to extend this approach beyond direct chip-tochip links. Broadcom has discussed support for AMD’s XGMI/Infinity Fabric traffic across future PCI Express switching technology, including PCIe Gen 7-era links. This is associated with AFL, or Accelerated Fabric Link, a proposed way to carry AMD fabric traffic, including XGMI, across switched physical links rather than only direct connections. Other interconnect technologies NVIDIA’s closest competing technology is NVLink, used to connect GPUs and other processors with a high bandwidth. Meanwhile, the broader industry is developing open interconnect standards such as CXL (Compute Express Link), UCIe (Universal Chiplet Interconnect Express) and UALink (Ultra Accelerator Link). CXL is aimed mainly at coherent communication between processors, accelerators and memory devices. UCIe is designed to connect chiplets inside a package. UALink, or Ultra Accelerator Link, is an open accelerator interconnect intended for direct high-speed communication between large numbers of AI accelerators in data centres. The UALink effort is backed by a wide group of companies, including AMD, Apple, AWS, Broadcom, Cisco, Google, HPE, Intel, Meta, Microsoft and others. Its goal is to create an open alternative to proprietary accelerator interconnects such as NVIDIA’s Fig.29: the Infinity Fabric architecture as used in the AMD EPYC 9004 Genoa. Source: www.servethehome.com/amdepyc-genoa-gaps-intel-xeon-in-stunning-fashion/amd-epyc-9004-genoa-infinity-fabric-overview 24 Silicon Chip Australia's electronics magazine siliconchip.com.au NVLink, reducing dependence on any single vendor’s ecosystem. Table 6: AMD’s current products More on heterogeneous computing Product Heterogeneous? Features Ryzen AI Yes Ryzen AI 300 series is CPU + GPU + NPU Ryzen Desktop/ Mobile APUs Yes With Radeon Graphics, CPU + GPU Instinct MI300/ MI350 series Yes Multi-chip CPU + GPU + HBM (High Bandwidth Memory) EPYC (many models) Highly High-core count CPUs with integrated graphics and AI acceleration Versal Adaptive (SoCs) Highly Arm CPU cores + GPU-like AI engines + FPGA fabric Kria SOMs Yes Embedded modules designed for heterogeneous ‘edge’ AI Radeon RX 7000/8000 series No Discrete graphics cards (shared driver/software ecosystem with Ryzen) Some EPYC and Ryzen chips No Some CPUs lack integrated graphics AMD later developed the heterogeneous computing idea in several directions: APUs for mainstream PCs and consoles, Radeon and Instinct accelerators for non-graphics workloads, and increasingly advanced interconnect technologies like Infinity Fabric. Chiplets are another major part of AMD’s modern approach. Rather than building every processor as one large monolithic die, AMD can combine several smaller, specialised dies inside one package. This improves manufacturing yield, allows different parts of the processor to be made on different process technologies, making it easier to scale core counts. Intel is also taking a chiplet-like approach now, albeit much later than AMD and using different technologies (we described their system in detail in the April 2026 issue). The same broader move toward heterogeneous and scalable computing is also visible in AMD’s Instinct MI-­ series accelerators. These high-­ performance data-centre GPUs are designed primarily for workloads such as AI, scientific simulation and high-­ performance computing, rather than conventional graphics output. So while Intel and AMD both offered integrated graphics, AMD’s Fusion/ APU strategy was different in emphasis. Intel’s integrated graphics were initially about platform integration and cost reduction, while AMD wanted the GPU to become a more powerful and programmable partner to the CPU. That vision took many years to become practical, but it now sits at the centre of AMD’s processor, accelerator and chiplet designs. Today’s computer graphics market The computer graphics market today is dominated by two primary players: NVIDIA, the clear leader, and AMD, with Intel trailing as a distant third through its Arc GPU range. Unfortunately, Arc’s future is looking uncertain at the moment. Modern graphics processing units (GPUs) do far more than simply rendering images on a computer monitor. They have become the basic hardware for artificial intelligence and machine siliconchip.com.au Table 7: technical terms for modern processor chip designs Term Meaning Usage APU (Accelerated Processing Unit) AMD’s official term for a processor that tightly integrates CPU cores and GPU cores (often with an NPU as well) on the same chip/package. Primarily AMD products Heterogeneous processor Any chip that combines different types of processors (CPU, GPU, NPU, DSP [digital signal processor] etc). Generalpurpose Heterogeneous SoC A System-on-Chip (SoC) that contains different processing elements. Generalpurpose Integrated Accelerator Processor Emphasises the presence of specialised accelerators (especially artificial intelligence). AI chips learning because they have thousands of simple processing cores that excel at performing highly parallel mathematical operations, particularly matrix multiplications and floating-point arithmetic. These operations form the core workload of neural networks during both AI training and inferencing tasks. This massive parallelism gives GPUs a huge performance advantage over traditional CPUs for AI tasks. Modern processors increasingly integrate powerful GPU cores directly onto the same package or die, making it less meaningful in many cases to think of the GPU as a completely separate unit. While AMD’s current strategy is based on the idea that future performance gains will come from tightly integrating different types of processing engines (CPU cores, GPU cores, Australia's electronics magazine AI accelerators etc), they still maintain plenty of traditional products (especially high-end discrete CPUs and GPUs) to serve specific markets, generating revenue while the heterogeneous vision matures. Table 6 indicates the mix of heterogeneous and traditional products. NPU stands for Neural Processing Unit; AMD’s name for their NPU architecture is XDNA. For general terminology, see Table 7. Next month We will start the third and final part of this series next month by looking at the Zen series of chips that has allowed AMD to take over a significant portion of the desktop and server CPU market, as well as make inroads into the mobile space. We will also give more details on chiplets, 3D V-Cache, Ryzen AI, Versal, SC Radeon/RDNA GPUs and more. December 2026  25